Trance

At one end of this continuum are scholars who espouse the concept of hypnotic state in its strongest possible form, as a condition that is fundamentally different from normal waking consciousness and from other altered states, such as daydreaming and relaxation. […]

At the other end of the continuum are theorists who use the term state to describe hypnotic phenomena but deny that it explains or causes those phenomena in any way; those who acknowledge allegiance to the state construct but then ignore it entirely in their theories of hypnotic responding; and those who explicitly reject the hypnotic state construct as inaccurate and misleading. Surprisingly, this latter group now includes some prominent Ericksonian clinicians (Zeig & Rennick, 1991) who maintain that the concept of trance has little explanatory value and claim that it only distracts from their preferred emphasis on hypnosis as an interpersonal process.

Between the two extreme positions on the state issue, there is a concept of trance as an altered state, one that is not unique to hypnosis. […]

The problem with these definitions of trance is that they are too inclusive, loose, and imprecise to be subjected to empirical study. Without some means of determining whether a person is in trance, it is impossible to test any hypotheses about the effects of trance.

There are two sets of data that have led to a convergence of opinion on the state issue among most researchers. The first is the very modest effect of hypnotic induction on suggestibility. Most people are almost as responsive to so-called "waking suggestions" as they are to the same suggestions given in a hypnotic context (E. R. Hilgard, 1965). The second is the consistent failure to find any reliable markers of the hypothesized state. Erickson’s (1941 /1980) hypothesized behavioral markers (literalism, catalepsy, and amnesia) have either failed to distinguish hypnotized from nonhypnotized participants (Green et al., 1990) or have been shown to be products of participants’ perceptions of the hypnotic role (Orne, 1959; Young & Cooper, 1972). Similarly, no physiological or even self-report markers of a hypnotic trance have been found (Dixon & Laurence, 1992; Kirsch, Mobayed, Council, & Kenny, 1992).

[…]

Having failed to find reliable markers of trance after 50 years of careful research, most researchers have concluded that this hypothesis has outlived its usefulness.

A second point of agreement is that many hypnotized subjects experience themselves as being in a special state of consciousness denoted by the term trance. Nonstate theorists do not reject the proposition that these experiences are real , although in many cases they may merely be deep relaxation interpreted as a hypnotic trance because they happen to be occurring in a hypnotic context. […]

There is yet another variant of the trance position that must be considered. Some writers see trance as an altered state, but not as one that occurs only in hypnosis. Trance may be identified as a state that often occurs in nonhypnotic contexts, such as daydreaming, absorption, focused attention , or concentration. Spiegel (1999), for example, has identified the hypnotic trance as "just a shift in attention." This very popular type of definition is consistent with nonstate formulations of hypnosis. It may indeed be true that responding to suggestion requires absorption or concentration. But if the hypnotic state is merely narrowly focused attention or absorption, then most people are in a hypnotized state when studying for or taking an exam, driving a car, watching a film, or engaging in any other absorbing task.

What is accomplished by calling these instances of hypnosis? It tells us nothing new about studying, driving, responding to suggestion, or any other activity that requires focused attention, and I cannot imagine us ever convincing the larger scholarly community that research on attentionally demanding tasks is by definition research on hypnosis . The term focused attention has the virtue of being more descriptive than the term hypnosis, and it has less surplus baggage associated with it. So if hypnosis is nothing more than a state of focused attention, perhaps we should consider names like American Journal of Focused Attention and American Society for Clinical Focused Attention as more accurate labels for our journals and organizations.

Gruzelier (2000) proposed that an integration of neurobiological and socio-cognitive perspectives could promote the understanding of hypnosis and its humanistic applications. He further stated, `… hypnosis is an altered state of brain functional organization …' (p. 51). Under a heading `The death knell of neurobiological investigation: the rush to judgment', Gruzelier (2000) states, `Kirsch and Lynn (1998) and Wagstaff (1998) claim that no marker of a hypnotic state has been discovered after decades of investigation, and that the search for one should be discontinued. A neurobiological explanation does not exist. Neurobiologists may rightly wonder how such an unworldly view exists' (p. 52).

In our 1995 review (Kirsch and Lynn 1995), we did state that after the failure to find reliable markers of trance after 50 years of careful research, `most researchers have concluded that this hypothesis has outlived its usefulness' (p. 853). However, we went on to say that this state of affairs did not preclude the possibility that such indicators would eventually be discovered, and we underscored the importance of identifying the physiological substrates of hypnosis. Far from declaring the issue dead, we identified three ways in which scientists could usefully approach the question of identifying the physiological substrates of hypnosis: (1) identify the physiological substrate of the hypothesized hypnotic state; (2) identify the physiological correlates of differences in hypnotic suggestibility; and (3) determine the physiological substrates of responses to suggestions.

The present chapter is written in the spirit of fostering a congenial dialogue between state and non-state theorists (Kihlstrom 2003). We will review studies relevant to each of the three ways we proposed to address the question of the physiological substrates of hypnosis, including studies that Christensen (2005, p. 286) identified as representing `replicated research over the past 2 decades supporting state-based theories of hypnosis'.

The design also fails to address the critical issue of the causal role of the trance state in producing other suggested subjective experiences. Hypnotic inductions are suggestions to experience a trance state. [emphasis added] For that reason, they should produce altered subjective states in many people, and these altered states should possess neural substrates (Kirsch and Lynn 1995). It is not clear that the experience and neural correlates of trance would be the same for all hypnotized subjects or even all virtuosos. Having different pre-conceptions about trance might lead to different subjective states and therefore to different neural substrates. In any case, the altered state hypothesis does not concern the existence of these altered states, but rather their hypothesized causal role in producing other hypnotic phenomena.

[…] Research in this area has succeeded in finding baseline correlates of suggestibility, effects of induction procedures and effects of other specific suggestions. Perhaps the most important finding to date is the specificity of neurological effects in response to the specific wording of suggestions. The neural concomitants of suggested analgesia, for example, seem to depend on the specific suggestion that is used (Rainville et al. 1998). This finding, however, also points to one of the weaknesses of some of the research. In particular, there has been a tendency to confound induction with suggestion variables, i.e. subjects either receive or do not receive a hypnotic induction and then are given a suggestion to experience a particular effect. However, the wording of the suggestion following a hypnotic induction differs from the wording of the suggestion given without the induction. This confound renders it impossible to ascertain what is responsible for obtained differences, and this problem is compounded by the finding that neural activity may be exquisitely sensitive to suggestion wording.

No specific physiological markers of the hypothesized hypnotic states have been found (Lynn, Kirsch, Knox, & Lilienfeld, 2006; see also chap. 4, this volume)

I’ve been operating under the assumption that the induction was just a suggestion to enter an imagined hypnotic state, but I had to read this book to realise the ferociousness with which some academics still (and I mean still) imagine that state to be real. As a final thought, if there isn’t anything magical going on during an induction, and an induction is just made up of words (no mesmeric fluid or invisible energy passing from hypnotist to participant), and practically anything can be used in place of an hypnotic induction (placebo pill, for example), then what else could the induction be, other than a series of suggestions? And what, other than a suggested state, could those suggestions suggest?

Surveys of students from various countries (Green, Page, Rasekhy, Johnson, & Bernhardt, 2006) document the wide prevalence of a number of myths and misconceptions we review. A powerful engine driving these myths is the popular media, including movies, television, and the Internet, which capitalize on the core myth that hypnosis is "an altered state of consciousness quite different from normal waking consciousness" (70% agreed, Green et al., 2006); termed by many, a trance. The myth of trance is arguably the mother of all myths [emphasis added] and has birthed many related myths that we will discuss.

The idea that hypnosis brings about a trance state was first popularized in Du Maurier’s blockbuster novel, Trilby (Du Maurier, 1894/1999), in which Svengali—a name now synonymous with a brutal manipulator uses hypnosis to ply the ill-starred Trilby to his will. De Maurier portrayed hypnosis as a sleep-like trance state that produced amnesia, loss of control and willpower, and special abilities (e.g., Trilby became an opera diva). The term "trance" is still featured in titles (and contents) of articles in influential hypnosis journals (e.g., Wickramasekera II, 2016) and unfortunately still carries the baggage of its historical roots.

Hypnotic trance is rarely clearly or explicitly defined by researchers or clinicians, and the nature of this hypothesized state has been described in a plethora of contradictory ways (see Kirsch & Lynn, 1995). One definition is that hypnotic trance is "the cognitive end state produced by a hypnotic induction procedure" (Halligan & Oakley, 2014, p. 111). While the authors are among the few to actually define "trance," broad definitions place no constraints on the nature or constituents of this state, which is often the case when this term is used. In the absence of reliable physiological markers, it is generally operationalized by self-report of its presence.

Despite concerted attempts, researchers have not succeeded in finding purported markers of the hypothesized hypnotic state. For example, Lynn et al. (2008); see also Lynn & Rhue, 1991) found no reliable evidence that hypnotic and nonhypnotic conditions differ in terms of (a) literalness of response to a series of questions (e.g., saying "no" to the question or negative shaking of the head in response to the question, "Do you mind telling me your name"); (b) trance logic (i.e., heightened tolerance for logical incongruity/saying a hallucinated person appears transparent), or the hidden observer phenomenon (i.e., a hidden part of consciousness directs behaviors/experiences, while another part, separated by an amnesic barrier, is unaware and responds in a manner consistent with suggestions). Either no differences are evident across hypnotic and nonhypnotic comparison conditions (e.g., nonhypnotized imagining participants or individuals who role play or simulate hypnotic responses: literalism, trance logic) and/or the findings are determined to be the product of suggestion or experimental demands (i.e., hidden observer) rather than an altered state unique to hypnosis (Kirsch & Lynn, 1998).

[A larger study] failed to find support for the claim that eye behaviors index a hypnotic state.

A cornerstone of our theory is that hypnosis unfolds independent of a background "trance" or special state of consciousness unique or specific to hypnosis. We argue that such a state is rendered irrelevant by findings that different hypnotic suggestions (i.e., direct imaginative suggestions) elicit diverse experiences and attendant alterations in consciousness (e.g., sensations, cognition, emotions, perceptions, memories), behaviors, and psychophysiological responses (Landry et al., 2017; Lynn et al., 2007), and no special state is required to experience a gamut of suggestions.